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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TAKING A SOFT LOOK AT
PROBABLE CAUSE: AN OBSCENE RESULT
FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS
Has the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William
Rehnquist, misread a decision by New York's highest court? Or has the
Supreme Court, by redefining Court precedent, purposely narrowed the
probable cause standard for reviewing a warrant application for seizure
of items presumptively protected by the first amendment? In New York
v. P.J. Video, Inc. ("P.J. Video II"),1 the Supreme Court reversed the
New York Court of Appeals ("P.J. Video I")2 and held that a higher
probable cause standard was not required for issuance of a warrant to
seize particular "adult" videocassettes protected under the first amend-
ment than to seize any other item.3 In an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist,4 the Court concluded that seizure of materials which
are presumptively protected by the first amendment should be reviewed
under the same standard of probable cause that is used to review warrant
applications generally.'
FACTS
In P.J. Video II, the defendant, P.J. Video, was charged with six
counts of obscenity under New York law. 6 The charges arose out of an
investigation by the Erie County District Attorney's Office. An investi-
gator reviewed approximately ten videocassette movies which had been
rented from the defendants' store. The investigator thereafter executed
affidavits summarizing the theme of and conduct depicted in each film.7
1. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986) rev'g State v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65
N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985).
2. State v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985).
3. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1615. This case involved a 6-3 decision in which Marshall,
J., filed a dissenting opinion with Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joining. Id. at 1619.
4. In October, 1986, Justice Rehnquist was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. However, throughout the majority of this casenote, Rehnquist will be re-
ferred to as Justice Rehnquist since he authored P.. Video II in his former capacity.
5. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1615.
6. New York law provides in part: "A person is guilty of obscenity in the third degree
when, knowing its content and character, he:
"1. Promotes, or possesses with the intent to promote, any obscene material ......
Id. at 1612 n.1 (citing N.Y. Penal law § 235.05(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
7. The five films that formed the basis for the obscenity charges were "California Valley
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At trial, P.J. Video moved to suppress the seized videocassettes,
claiming that the warrant authorizing seizure was issued without prob-
able cause to believe that the movies were obscene.8 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling which upheld the motion
to suppress the evidence.9 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the New York high court, holding that the affidavits describing the mov-
ies seized' ° were sufficient for the magistrate to authorize seizure of the
"obscene" materials.1'
MAJORITY'S REASONING
In PJ. Video II, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the law was clearly
established in a long line of precedent' 2 that defined the requirements for
obtaining such a search warrant.' 3 According to Rehnquist, the first
amendment would not be violated by issuance of such a warrant if a
neutral magistrate, before issuing the warrant, either personally viewed
the materials seized or was provided with affidavits which adequately de-
scribed, in detail, the conduct depicted in those materials. ' The
Supreme Court reversed the state court decision, saying that the court of
Girls," "Taboo," "Taboo II," "All American Girls," and the always popular "Debbie Does
Dallas." Id. at 1613 n.3.
8. New York law defines "obscene" as follows: "Any material or performance is 'ob-
scene' if (a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that
considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to the prurient interests in sex, and (b) it
depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner, actual or simulated: sexual intercourse,
sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism, masochism, excretion or lewd exhibition of
the genitals, and (c) considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value." Id. at 1612 n.1 (citing N.Y. Penal law § 235.00 (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
9. P.J. Video I, 106 S. Ct. at 1613. The Village of Depew Justice Court granted the
motion for suppression because the issuing justice had not personally viewed the movies. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling without relying on the lower court's theory.
The court of appeals held that a "higher" standard for evaluation of a warrant application
existed when seeking to seize such things as books and films. P. Video , 65 N.Y.2d at 569,
483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
10. These affidavits merely described specific scenes in the seized movies. They were the
sole information examined by the magistrate. Out of a list of approximately 30 potentially
obscene videocassettes, 10 affidavits were executed and the films were seized. The defendants
were charged with violating the New York obscenity law with respect to only 5 of the 10
movies. The Court did not discuss any evidence as to how the list was narrowed and what
differed between the five obscene films and the other five. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1616-19.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1615 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483 (1973); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)).
13. See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
14. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1614 n.5. See also Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. at 637.
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appeals used a "higher standard for evaluation of a warrant application
seeking to seize such things as books and films, as distinguished from one
seeking to seize weapons or drugs."' 5
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist concluded that by applying a higher
standard for review of probable cause, the New York Court of Appeals
was creating a new requirement beyond those defined in Supreme Court
precedent. Instead, the proper standard for the magistrate reviewing the
warrant application should have been whether "a probability or substan-
tial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity"
existed. 6 Hence, the Supreme Court reasoned that by using the words
"higher standard," the New York Court of Appeals went beyond prece-
dent, creating its own new standard for review.
ANALYSIS
Although at first glance the Supreme Court decision appears well-
reasoned, closer scrutiny reveals that the New York Court of Appeals in
PJ. Video I did not require warrants for seizure of first amendment
materials to be tested under a higher standard. Rather, the court of ap-
peals properly followed precedent when noting that materials protected
by the first amendment should not be seized without using "scrupulous
exactitude" in the warrant issuing procedure.' 7 Hence, Rehnquist's un-
derstanding of P.J. Video I appears to be incorrect. Although the New
York Court of Appeals does use the phrase "higher standard" in P.J
Video I, the Supreme Court misconstrued the use of that language. A
review of the New York high court's decision and of Supreme Court
precedent pertaining to this issue will demonstrate that the dissent in P.J.
Video II was correct and that P.J. Video I should not have been reversed.
P.J. Video II turns on the issue of the proper standard of probable
cause for obtaining a search warrant to seize materials presumptively
protected by the first amendment. The New York Court of Appeals con-
15. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504; Marcus, 367 U.S. at
730-31). The term "higher standard" is mentioned only once in the New York Court of Ap-
peals' opinion. P.J. Video , 65 N.Y.2d at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991. In
fact, the dissent in the present case noted that no extraordinary standard of scrutiny was ap-
plied to the determination of probable cause. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1620 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
16. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1616 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13
(1983)). See also Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339 (1813).
17. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1614 n.5. See also P.J. Video 1, 65 N.Y.2d at 569, 483
N.E.2d at 1122-23, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 990-91 (where the New York Court of Appeals argued
that the magistrate should have before him the "full facts from which inference might be
drawn, and information necessary to determine their reliability" and he must undertake a
searching inquiry of them).
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cluded that, due to certain protections and guarantees of the first amend-
ment, a great degree of thoroughness should be administered when a
magistrate considers interfering with such vital interests."8 This empha-
sis on exactness is demanded when a magistrate specifically analyzes first
amendment materials. Without such exactness, first amendment guaran-
tees might soon be eroded. The magistrate, when reviewing an applica-
tion for such a warrant, must "focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity."' 9
In reviewing the P.J. Video I decision, Justice Rehnquist examined
the express language used by the New York Court of Appeals rather
than the broad meaning. Focusing on the words "higher standard," the
Supreme Court reasoned that an additional requirement was created by
the New York high court which apparently was to be implemented when
establishing probable cause for seizing materials presumptively protected
by the first amendment. According to Rehnquist, no distinction should
be made between the type of materials seized and hence the court of
appeals should have implemented the standard set forth in Illinois v.
Gates.2" As concluded by the Court, the standard should have been one
applicable to all warrants generally. "The term 'probable cause,' ...
means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. . . ." "The
task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affida-
vits before him,... there is a fair probabilty that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place."" l
This narrow reading of the language in P.J. Video I misconstrues the
intended meaning of the New York Court of Appeals. When the court of
appeals used the words "higher standard," the court was merely sug-
gesting the need for a more careful and precise scrutinization when deter-
mining items to be "probably" obscene. In fact, the phrase "higher
standard" was only mentioned once in PJ. Video I. Moreover, the dis-
sent in P.J. Video II correctly notes that no "extraordinary standard of
scrutiny" was applied to the "determination of probable cause."22 The
18. P.J. Video I, 65 N.Y.2d at 572, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993. Although
this degree of thoroughness is not self-defining, it does seem to imply that the magistrate
should scrutinize the information presented to see whether it clearly demonstrates a "prob-
able" violation of the obscenity test. Also, the magistrate should be wary of any first amend-
ment infringements, applying procedures enunciated infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
19. P.. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1614. See also Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. at 637 and Mar-
cus, 367 U.S. at 732.
20. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1615-16 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 238-39).
21. Id. See e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (quoting Locke v. United States, II
U.S. 348 (1813)).
22. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1620 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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New York Court of Appeals, more accurately, concluded that to author-
ize seizure of items protected by the first amendment, the magistrate
must act with scrupulous exactitude.23 Such exactitude may not be re-
quired for warrants concerning drugs, possession of which is not consti-
tutionally guaranteed.
Although the New York high court's approach stressing exactness is
not clearly definable, it appears that first amendment guarantees would
be ensured when a "sufficiency of the material before the magistrate"
exists.24 The magistrate is required to "take a 'hard look' at it, exercising
care to adhere to the proper legal standard so that his subjective views or
those of the police do not infringe upon the constitutional rights of citi-
zens."25 This goal presumably can only be achieved by presenting the
magistrate with proper and thorough information upon which he or she
can administer the applicable procedures. Thus, in reviewing the affida-
vits in the present case, the New York Court of Appeals determined that
when carefully examining the evidence of probable cause (and consider-
ing first amendment interests), the magistrate was not provided sufficient
evidence to issue a search warrant.26
In P.J. Video 1, Justice Rehnquist held that it was "clear beyond
peradventure that the warrant was supported by probable cause to be-
lieve that the five films were obscene under New York law."' 27 The
Supreme Court thus concluded that the affidavits contained sufficient in-
formation for a magistrate to determine a fair probability that criminal
activity existed. 28 Unfortunately, the Court fails to explain this conclu-
sion. The affidavits mentioned nothing specifically about whether the
films had any artistic value or how it should be regarded in light of con-
temporary community standards. A more precise approach would scru-
tinize these elements from the applicable obscenity statute.
It is ironic that in the Supreme Court's desire to prevent any
"higher" standard or any alteration of its own Court decisions, the Court
itself acted in the careless, imprecise fashion which the New York Court
of Appeals had attempted to prevent. As the New York high court
23. P.J. Video I, 65 N.Y.2d at 572, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993. See also
Maryland v. Macon, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985) (where the Supreme Court held that when a
county detective purchased several magazines from a book store, such actions did not consti-
tute a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and thus the magazines
were properly admitted in evidence as pertaining to the obscenity charges).
24. P.J. Video 1, 65 N.Y.2d at 572, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93.
25. Id. at 572, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
26. Id.
27. P.J. Video 11, 106 S. Ct. at 1616.
28. Id.
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feared, P.J. Video H was decided without the Court taking a "hard look"
at the evidence when establishing probable cause for seizure of items pre-
sumptively guaranteed by the first amendment.29 As pointed out by the
dissent in P.J. Video II, the affidavits "merely catalogued" specific sex
acts in the films, without examining the films as a whole3", which is re-
quired under obscenity laws. The affidavits say "nothing about whether
the film, considered as a whole, has any artistic value ... [or anything]
about how the film should be regarded in light of contemporary commu-
nity standards."31
The dissent in P.J. Video H determined that, by requiring sufficient
evidence as to the elements of obscenity pursuant to New York law,
probable cause could not be established. " 'There must be enough infor-
mation before [the issuing magistrate] in one form or another . . . to
enable him to judge the obscenity of the film, not of isolated scenes from
it.' "32 The dissent determined that such sufficient information did not
exist.33 In contrast, the majority inferred probable cause with respect to
only two of the three elements of obscenity. 34 This conclusion by the
Court is never substantiated. Instead, the majority without discussion
found "beyond peradventure" that the affidavits set out the requisite
probable cause.35 Unfortunately, such an approach which allows for
probable cause to be inferred fails to adequately protect special first
amendment interests.
Although no Supreme Court case has conclusively held that a
higher standard is applied for warrants to seize items protected by the
first amendment, Supreme Court precedent cited in both P.J. Video I and
29. Id. at 1620-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. See supra notes 6-8.
31. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1621 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985). In Brockett, the Court considered an action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a Washington moral nuisance statute which set forth a
comprehensive scheme for criminal and civil penalties for those dealing in obscenities. The
Supreme Court partially invalidated the statute only insofar as it contained the word "lust"
which should have been understood as including constitutionally protected materials.
In fact, several of the films in the present case were declared by New York to be outside
the consitutional boundaries of obscenity. See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene
Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1983) (where the Second Circuit held that various arti-
cles of merchandise seized were not obscene or patently offensive based upon the contempo-
rary community standard in the New York area). By failing to provide the magistrate with
evidence as to whether community standards may potentially be violated, even probable cause
(not just actual obscenity violations) of obscenity may be lacking.
32. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1620 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting P.J. Video 1, 65
N.Y.2d at 571, 483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993).
33. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1620 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id. See P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1616.
35. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1616.
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P.J. Video II does recognize the need to protect unique first amendment
interests.36 The New York Court of Appeals based its decision on this
precedent. However, Justice Rehnquist appears to redefine the case law
without expressly modifying or reversing the precedent.37
According to Justice Rehnquist, the proper standard to be applied
has been set forth in many Supreme Court cases. "In our view, the long-
standing special protections ... are adequate to ensure that first amend-
ment interests will not be impaired by the issuance and execution of
warrants authorizing the seizure of books or films.""8 Although Rehn-
quist alludes to "special protections" of items within the first amend-
ment, he concludes that a general probable cause standard should be
uniformly applied. That rule is contrary to the very precedent he relies
on and possibly encroaches on first amendment rights.
When examining the Supreme Court precedent cited, it appears that
a more precise standard does exist in the first amendment field, just as
understood by the New York Court of Appeals. In Roaden v. Ken-
tucky,39 the Court acknowledged the inherent danger when items are
seized without addressing first amendment concerns. In Roaden, a
county sheriff viewed a sexually explicit film at a drive-in theater. At the
conclusion of the showing, the sheriff seized one copy of the film without
any prior judicial determination of obscenity. The Supreme Court held
the seizure to be unreasonable not because it would have been easy to
obtain a warrant, but rather because it constituted a prior restraint of the
right of expression.' The Court noted:
A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one set-
ting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect
to another kind of material.... The seizure of instruments of a
crime, such as a pistol or a knife, or 'contraband or stolen
goods or objects dangerous in themselves,' are to be distin-
guished from quantities of books and movie films when a court
appraises the reasonableness of the seizure under the fourth or
fourteenth amendment standards.4
36. See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
37. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1615.
38. Id. (emphasis added). However, it is unclear whether the so-called "'special protec-
tions" enunciated in the cited cases (See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text) remain
applicable if the current probable cause standard for first amendment materials follows Illinois
v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). Interestingly, this opinion was joined by
Justice Rehnquist.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 501-02 (citations omitted).
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Hence, the Roaden Court found that due to the possibility of an
unconstitutional prior restraint of free speech, a higher hurdle exists in
the evaluation of reasonableness,42 which effectively prevents the police
from relying on the "exigency exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirements." 43 Justice Rehnquist cited Roaden but he does not
distinguish the holding nor the Court's language which recognized
unique first amendment concerns. Roaden should not be distinguished
merely because P.J. Video I did not involve seizure by a police officer.
Although P.J. Video I involved a seizure authorized by a magistrate,
both cases acknowledged the necessity of following special procedures
before issuing a warrant. More importantly, Roaden recognized gener-
ally that such a seizure may involve a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression. By requiring the magistrate to carefully examine evidence of
each obscenity element, the likelihood of an unlawful prior restraint will
be lessened.
Before the Roaden decision, the Court in Marcus v. Search War-
rant" and in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas45 ruled that a large-scale
seizure of books or films had to be preceded by an adversarial hearing on
the question of obscenity. In Marcus, a warrant was issued without any
scrutiny of the seized material by a judge and was based on conclusory
assertions of a single police officer. The Court noted that special proce-
dures had to be followed prior to seizure.46 "[A] State's power to sup-
press obscenity is limited by the constitutional protections for free
expression."4
The sense of this holding was reaffirmed in A Quantity of Books,
holding unconstitutional a "massive seizure" of books from a commer-
cial bookstore for the purpose of destroying the books as contraband.
The Court recognized the requirement of an adversary hearing prior to
seizure and emphasized that standards for seizing allegedly obscene
books should differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gam-
42. Id. at 504.
43. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504. The majority in PJ. Video H warned that this "higher hur-
dle ... of reasonableness" does not establish a greater standard of probable cause for seizure of
first amendment materials. P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1615 n.6. However, the New York
Court of Appeals did not implement a greater requirement for review, but rather recognized
the need for a systematic procedural approach to fully protect first amendment principles.
44. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
45. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
46. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731-32. Such special procedures appear to allow the owner of the
seized materials opportunity to contest the propriety of such seizure. Also, the warrant appli-
cation must be presented to a judge with a detailed description as to precisely why the materi-
als "probably" violate the obscenity laws.
47. Id. at 730.
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bling paraphernalia and other contraband.4" Neither Marcus nor A
Quantity of Books, which both recognized special first amendment pro-
tections, are distinguished by Rehnquist. Although both cases involved a
mass seizure of materials, they are applicable to the present case because
these cases recognize the need for some type of judicial hearing where the
adverse party may raise first amendment concerns before the issuing
magistrate. Arguably it may no longer be true that this hearing must
occur prior to seizure, however the desirability of giving the adverse
party prompt opportunity to contest seizure prior to trial remains. It is
unclear whether this procedure will be required if a general "fair
probability" standard is implemented as the P.J. Video H Court advises.
Such special procedural guidelines may not be required because not all
materials (such as drugs) are presumptively protected by the Constitu-
tion. In other words, by merely following a "fair probability" approach,
an issuing magistrate may not be required to carefully consider first
amendment interests, but could generally determine whether criminal ac-
tivity exists. If criminal activity is apparent any potential first amend-
ment protections may be bypassed.
In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia,49 the Court held that an applica-
tion for a warrant to seize materials protected by the first amendment
had to provide the magistrate with precise factual evidence as to obscen-
ity.5" The Court examined the constitutionality of a warrant for seizure
of films from a commercial theater. The warrant application before the
magistrate was based solely on a police officer's affidavit describing the
films. As stated by the Court:
[T]he procedure under which the warrant issued solely
upon conclusory assertions of the police officer without any
inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the
officer's conclusions was not a procedure 'designed to focus
searchingly on the question of obscenity,' and therefore fell short
of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity
to freedom of expression.5 '
In P.J. Video II, the affidavits in question merely selected specific
scenes without delving into the film's content as a whole when compared
to the applicable community standards. 52 Lee Art Theatre appears to
imply that in focusing searchingly on the elements of obscenity, the affi-
48. A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 211-12.
49. 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
50. Id. at 637.
51. Id. (quoting Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732) (emphasis added).
52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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davit must specifically demonstrate these elements of obscenity. This is
especially necessary since generally a judge does not personally view the
materials. Hence, as in Lee Art Theatre, the affidavits presented to the
magistrate cannot be based on general assertions made by the investigat-
ing officer. Similarly, as in P.J. Video I, by merely selecting specific
scenes from the films, a magistrate will not be presented the proper evi-
dence as to violation of the applicable obscenity laws.
The New York Court of Appeals further relied on Stanford v.
Texas," a case in which a district judge issued a warrant authorizing the
seizure of books and other written instruments concerning the commu-
nist party of Texas.54 There, evidence obtained through a general war-
rant was suppressed by the Court in order to protect ideas and
expressions. The Supreme Court in P.J. Video II failed to demonstrate
why the expressions in the materials seized from the defendants should
not also be protected from seizure.
The only precedent that Rehnquist elaborates on in detail is Heller
v. New York." In Heller, a judge, upon the request of police officers,
viewed a sexually explicit film. Without a prior adversary hearing, the
judge signed warrants for seizure of the film. The Supreme Court held
that a prior adversary hearing was not required to safeguard first amend-
ment interests when probable cause was determined by a neutral magis-
trate following a prompt post-seizure hearing.56 Rehnquist emphasized
that when a magistrate examines the sufficiency of probable cause prior
to seizure, first amendment interests would be properly protected.57
However, the Supreme Court in P.J. Video II further held that in
order to determine probable cause, the magistrate need merely question
whether the affidavit contains sufficient information for a magistrate to
determine a "fair probability that criminal activity existed."5 " Following
this standard, it is questionable whether the magistrate must implement
any other procedures to safeguard first amendment rights. Although the
special procedures enunciated in the cited precedent do not imply that a
higher amount of probable cause be shown, the case law does suggest the
need for exactness when specifically examining items presumptively pro-
tected by the first amendment.59 The New York Court of Appeals in P.J.
Video I recognized such a unique concern for precise judicial procedures
53. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
54. Id. at 477.
55. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
56. Id. at 488.
57. P... Video II, 106 S. Ct. at 1614-15.
58. Id. at 1616.
59. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
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which are not necessarily required when seizing such items as drugs. 60
CONCLUSION
It is arguable that a more precise approach could be considered a
"higher" standard. However, in the available case law, unique proce-
dural safeguards exist which are intended to protect first amendment in-
terests. 6' The evidence must provide a magistrate sufficient information
and descriptions of the materials in order to apply the proper obscenity
test. Also, the needs of the police will be addressed with an acknowl-
edgement that the items in question are presumptively protected by the
Constitution. No such recognition of constitutional guarantees exists
when seizing other types of materials. Therefore, by requiring a system-
atic procedural approach when reviewing applications for seizure of first
amendment items, such constituitonal freedoms will be protected. It
does not appear that the basic standard for review set out in P.J. Video 11
will adequately ensure those constitutional rights.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in P.J. Video II will most likely
have an unfortunate impact. P.J. Video II turns back the clock on the
advance of first amendment rights; the Court has narrowed the protec-
tion of the first amendment when reviewing applications for search war-
rants. This newly-defined standard is contrary to the Supreme Court's
own precedent in the area. Moreover, the impact will be a movement
away from exercising "special procedural protections" when seizing
materials presumptively guaranteed by the first amendment. 62 The
Court may not have considered the chilling effect this will have on free
speech.
In general, the Supreme Court will not allow state courts to increase
standards set by the Court. The Supreme Court recognizes the need for
certainty and uniformity when applying first and fourth amendment
standards. The P.J. Video II decision appears to have been a concern for
uniformity in obtaining a warrant for seizure of all types of materials.
However, the New York Court of Appeals recognized the necessity of
uniform procedures that address certain first amendment interests; a ju-
dicial procedure which sets out guidelines when examining the seizure of
60. P.J. Video 1. 65 N.Y.2d at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
61. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
62. As argued by the dissent, "The New York courts have unanimously held in this case
that the affidavits were insufficient to [find probable cause]. The majority's eagerness to reverse
that fact-bound determination in order to expedite an obscenity prosecution is inappropriate
and reflects a dubious notion of this Court's institutional role." P.J. Video II, 106 S. Ct. at
1622 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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items presumptively protected by the Constitution. Thus, after P.J.
Video II, it is unclear whether any special procedures remain beyond
merely allowing a police officer to determine whether a fair probability of
criminal activity exists.
This problem of clearly defining uniform seizure procedures in the
obscenity field is further compounded when each state applies its own
obscenity statute. In other words, first amendment rights may differ be-
tween states depending on the various approaches in labeling the materi-
als as probably being criminal activity. However, in all cases involving
the seizure of materials presumptively protected, the mere seizure of such
items will effect more than due process rights of a fair trial. Substantive
first amendment rights may be violated by the pre-trial seizure. A stan-
dard based solely on fair probability that a crime exists may not properly
safeguard such constitutional rights especially since each state may take
a varied approach to obscenity violations.
Hence, the Supreme Court's decision further confuses rather than
clarifies obscenity prevention. By requiring a general probable cause
standard for reviewing all warrant applications, the Court leaves unset-
tled precisely which judicial procedures remain in order to protect first
amendment rights even where criminal activity may exist. Thus, not
only does the application of the obscenity test vary among states, the
procedures for establishing probable cause to obtain a search warrant is
left unclear under the new interpretation of several Supreme Court cases
addressing the issue. If the Court's desire for uniformity prompted a
narrowing of the probable cause standard, this unfortunately comes at
the expense of first amendment interests.
Daniel P. Wien
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